This article proposes that returnee entrepreneurs transfer their tacit knowledge of foreign institutions, which can help entrepreneurial firms overcome the formalization challenges they face during times of transition. The results of 355 newly public Chinese entrepreneurial firms indicate that returnee CEOs, especially those who have returned from countries with advanced legal institutions or a national culture of low power distance and individualism, increase post-IPO performance. The evidence is consistent with the tacit knowledge transfer view and not driven by resource transfer or endogeneity issues. Furthermore, we find that venture capital funds facilitate the knowledge transfer, especially when both VCs and CEOs are from countries with advanced institutions.
INTRODUCTION
The impact of social institutions on financial market activities becomes an important issue in international business (IB) studies. La Porta et al. (1998) shows that advanced institutions are associated with better development of financial markets around the world. The literature provides evidence that the institution significantly affects the decision of venture capital's (VC) crossborder investment (Guler and Guillen, 2010; Dai and Nahata, 2016) and the return of VC's crossborder investments and firms' acquisitions (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nahata et al., 2014) in IB and internationalization. However, whether or not these institutions can be transferred from countries with more developed institutions to countries with less developed institutions through internationalization remains under-researched. Kwok and Tadesse (2006a) show that multinational companies (MNCs) transfer advanced institutions from developed countries to less developed countries through regulatory pressure effects, demonstration effects, and professionalization effects. Although the institutions are transferred by organizations (MNCs), whether or not individuals also play an agent role in transferring advanced institutions and whether or not such transfer enhances corporate performance have not been researched in the literature.
Along with the development of globalization, international human capital mobility has become prevalent, especially regarding the brain gain phenomenon in emerging markets.
Returnees tend to have accumulated explicit knowledge about technology and foreign markets through their overseas experience, which can bring about advantages in terms of high-tech firm innovation, high tech industry development, exportation and entrepreneurial decisions (Liu et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Kenney et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016) . To what extent returnees' tacit knowledge of foreign institutions, such as the legal system and culture, can influence firm outcome has not been explored. This paper intends to shed light on this important issue.
The recently launched Chinese start-up board for innovative enterprises and growing startups, known as ChiNext, provides a unique setting to test the impact of tacit knowledge of foreign institutions on entrepreneurial transitions. For example, the transition of going from a private to a public firm is a crucial milestone for entrepreneurial firms: both the internal structure and external environment become more complex. Newly public firms face several challenges to overcome irregularity and ensure regulatory compliance. Since the legal institutions in China are weak, we predict that returnee CEOs of entrepreneurial firms have advantages over local firms in terms of their tacit knowledge about more advanced institutions, such as a better sense of legal enforcement and democracy, which contributes to organizational formalization. As a result, returnee CEOs better adapt to transitions to overcome the formalization challenges.
We examine 355 newly public entrepreneurial firms in the ChiNext board market between 2009 and 2012 and find that returnee CEOs have a positive impact on firm performance. To further establish that the positive impact is due to their tacit knowledge about more advanced institutions, we identify overseas destinations of returnee CEOs and test whether CEOs who returned from countries with stronger legal systems and less cultural inequality have a higher positive impact on the firm's performance. The finding confirms the tacit knowledge transfer view. An alternative interpretation of our results is that entrepreneurial firms with good performance are more likely to appoint returnee CEOs. We eliminate such interpretation by using propensity-score matching and instrument variable approaches.
Tacit knowledge is transferred from returnee CEOs to other people in the organization.
Trust and share values are important during the transfer process (Dhanaraj et al., 2004) . As important and influential strategic investors, VC (venture capital) funds, with their expertise and voting power, largely affect a firm's internal environment and corporate strategies. A good match of expertise between VCs and portfolio firms contributes to firm performance when portfolio firms go public (Lungeanu and Zajac, 2015) . We posit that foreign VCs also have tacit knowledge about advanced foreign social institutions, which provides trust for the strategy and support of institutional change. As predicted, we find that returnee CEOs perform better when their firms are backed by foreign venture capital from countries with stronger institutions. The results are more pronounced when both returnee CEOs and foreign VCs are from countries with strong institutions. This paper makes three major contributions to the current literature. First, it adds to the literature on the relationship between the cross-border institution differences and the financial markets in IB studies. The cross-border difference of institutions is an important determinant of VC's cross-border investment decision (Guler and Guillen, 2010; Dai and Nahata, 2016) and the outcome of VC cross-border investment and international acquisitions (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nahata et al., 2014) . Kwok and Tadesse (2006a) provide evidence foreign institutions can be transferred from countries with strong institutions to countries with weak institutions through MNCs. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to provide evidence that individuals can also transfer advanced foreign institutions and use them to meet the challenges of entrepreneurial firms during transition periods, thus enhancing firm performance.
Second, this paper extends the literature on returnees and the brain gain phenomenon. Mahoney and Kor (2015) stress that future empirical studies in the firm-specific human capital should focus on the key constituent of tacit knowledge. The existing literature focuses on the highly skilled human capital of returnees in high-tech start-ups (Liu et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Kenney et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016) . We, however, extend the focus to returnees' tacit knowledge of foreign legal systems and culture, and we argue that the brain gain in developing countries is not limited to the explicit knowledge of technology or patents but on the social institutions. The unique setting of entrepreneurial firms in the transition stage in China enables us to explore how this tacit knowledge helps firms to overcome the challenges regarding formalization and regulatory compliance.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on the matching of strategic investors and executives. Lungeanu and Zajac (2015) argue that a good match of expertise between VC and portfolio companies (PC) has a positive impact on the PC's post-IPO performance. They emphasize that the fit between the expertise of VC partners and portfolio firms' top executives is an important issue to explore in the future research. We advance the literature by proposing indicators for a good match, such as their shared knowledge and experience on advanced institutions. We argue that returnees learn advanced institutions while they are abroad. Institutions refer to the legal system and the national culture. Compared with foreign developed countries and many developing countries, the legal institutions of China are very weak (Allen et al., 2005; La porta et al., 1998 The transition from a private to a public firm is a crucial milestone for entrepreneurial firms.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The dramatic development during the transition period poses management challenges to CEOs. 
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

Tacit Knowledge of Institutions
Resource-based theory (RBT) argues that valuable, rare, and inimitable resources could contribute to a firms' sustainable growth (Penrose, 1959) and competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984) . The literature on resources has increasingly focused on intangible resources of human capital, such as knowledge, as important contributing factors to a firm's performance and sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1992; Grant, 1996) . Knowledge is classified into explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge depending on the method of transferability (Nonaka, 1994) . While explicit knowledge is revealed through its communication and is directly transferred to firms because it is easily codified, accessed, and verbalized, tacit knowledge is acquired from prior experience and is slow, costly, and unpredictably transferred between people (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . For example, acquiring skills for tasting wine, riding a bicycle, or playing a guitar are wellknown examples of tacit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) show that individuals' tacit knowledge is highly valued for technological innovation and organizational learning. Although social institutions are an important type of tacit knowledge, their transfer and impact have not been studied in the literature. We intend to examine the effect of social institutions through the "brain gain" phenomenon to fill the literature gap.
Institutions are social rules that shape people's behavior in the human's daily life; therefore, returnees could obtain tacit knowledge about foreign social institutions from their overseas living experiences. North (1990) documents that institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. The devised
constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. The major function of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction, such as greeting friends, driving cars, forming a business, and borrowing money (North, 1990) . Since the social institution is an invisible mechanism and system for social life, it is mainly reflected from people's daily behavior.
Institutions are classified into the formal, such as the legal system, and the informal system, such as the culture. Legal systems are a fundamental determinant for the development of financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 2000 . La Porta et al. (1997) show that common law countries, which typically have stronger legal protection for investors than civil law countries, are associated with larger and more developed capital markets. Because legal systems are an essential element of corporate governance and finance, a better legal environment can protect outsiders, such as shareholders and creditors, from expropriation by insiders (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 2000 .
Given the weak legal institutions in China (Allen et al., 2005) , overseas Chinese experience more advanced institutions in developed foreign countries.
Culture is a form of informal constraint that guides people's daily interaction. It is transmitted from one generation to the next through teaching and imitation of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; North, 1990) . Culture as an important type of social constraint also affects investor protection (Stulz and Williamson, 2003) and subsequently determines the development of financial markets (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006b) after controlling for the impact of formal institutions.
Social institutions have the capacity to change individual behavior by forcing individuals to conform to legal rules, which, in turn, becomes tacit knowledge. When people live in a foreign country, they adapt and acquire certain ideologies and behavior patterns under the new social institutions. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the UN's diplomats from high corruption countries accumulate significantly more unpaid parking violations in New York, but the number sharply drops after 2002 when diplomats could no longer avoid paying parking fines.
Culture shapes individual behavior as a kind of social institution. Junior partners in a society with a strong power distance culture are more likely to conform to senior partners due to the ideology of their unequal relationship (Hofstede, 2001 ).
We argue that the social institution that overseas Chinese acquire in developed countries represent important tacit knowledge for use when they return to China. The "brain gain"
phenomenon brings not only advanced technologies but also advanced ideologies. Wang and Miao (2013) undertake a survey for returnees by receiving 913 effective questionnaires, which show that 53.8% of returnees are not conformable with the environment of China due to disparate social institutions they have experienced. This evidence could imply that they may seek to implement their tacit knowledge of advanced institutions to create a more pleasant working environment when they are in the positions of CEOs. Lam (2000) notes that the interaction of knowledge, organizational forms, and societal institutions contributes to a firm's learning and innovation.
Although not as easily transferrable as explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge could be used to address tasks and consign new organizational knowledge.
Tacit Knowledge and Firm Transitions
Going public is a transformational organizational event and often marks the start of the formal evolution of a firm under the framework of the regulators and the exchange. As a consequence of going public, newly public firms become more complex in terms of corporate structure, and the strategic needs of entrepreneurial firms evolve along with the ongoing public process. The irregularity prior to IPO may not affect the firm's growth and profitability, as long as the firm possesses certain technological advantages or secures a few major clients. Due to the legitimate risk of star-ups in China, irregularity becomes a main barrier for newly public firms.
They confront several new challenges such as adapting to enhanced scrutiny of their business, financing, and investment decisions from potential investors, regulators, analysts, and the business press (Jain and Kini, 2008) . The legitimacy issue becomes severe as external monitors, such as regulators, the media, and public investors are more stringent to listed firms.
The tacit knowledge of advanced institutions gained by returnee CEOs bring them advantages in addressing the challenge of legitimacy. Institutions can influence the ideology and practice of returnee CEOs and the literature notes that advanced institutions lead to improved corporate governance, strong right protection of creditors and shareholders, and better compliance of law and regulations (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 2000 . Investor protection ensures external financing opportunities for entrepreneurial firms to finance long-term growth projects (La Porta et al., 2000) . Strong institutions also increase the public firms' market valuation by enhancing the confidence of public investors (La Porta et al., 1997) , and reduce the cost of legitimate risks by conforming to the regulations and avoiding regulatory enforcements.
In addition to the external challenges from the market, firms also confront internal challenges stemming from the increasingly complex structure of organization and assets. We argue that returnee CEOs are more capable than non-returnee CEOs of addressing the problems within complex structure of organization and assets. With their tacit knowledge of strong legal enforcement, returnee CEOs intend to establish a management system where the internal regulations are closely enforced and corporate strategies are well implemented. In addition, unlike the example from the Chinese culture, where the junior partner owes the senior partner respect and obedience (Hofstede and Bond, 1988) , the social culture in the western countries, especially in the U.S., stresses the importance of individualistic values in the organization (McGrath et al. 1992; Ralston et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996) . Thus, returnee CEOs tend to create a working environment with more equity between people that encourages employees to take initiative at work and avoid bureaucracy.
We predict, based on the above discussion, that the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs can help newly public firms to establish the formal (e.g., effective compliance programs) and informal (e.g., corporate culture) organizational institutions during the transition period and, subsequently, improve firm performance. We hereby propose Hypothesis 1, as follows: In addition to the legal institutions, informal institutions (e.g., the national culture) also vary across different countries (Hofstede, 2001) . To further establish the impact of tacit knowledge on returnee CEOs, we need to observe that returnee CEOs returned from countries with different national cultures have different impacts on performance 12 . Two major dimensions for national cultures are power distance and individualism (Hofstede, 2001) . Power distance refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. Individualism refers to the degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups.
In countries with a low power distance culture, such as the Netherlands, the UK, the US, Germany, and the Nordic countries, the relations between expecting and accepting power are more democratic and possess more consultative relations; people are relatively interdependent to the power holders. Under these circumstances, the decentralized authority and flat management structure universally exist 13 . Such culture helps to retain the environment of critical thinking when the number of employee largely increases and organization structure becomes more complex in transitions. In countries with an individualistic culture, such as the US, Australia, the UK, and Canada, there is focus on achieving the objective of individuals and showing the value of individuals (Hofstede, 2001) . The needs, values, and goals of the individual take precedence over those of the in-group in individualist cultures (Gudykunst, 1997) . Strong individualism cultures tend to be associated with expressing individuals' ideas and demonstrating personal values, which help to enhance accountability in transitions. Therefore, CEOs returned from countries with cultures of low distance power and individualism are more capable of addressing the management challenges in firm transitions, leading to superior post-IPO performance. We hereby propose Hypothesis 3, as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The national cultures of low power distance and individualism of CEOs'
destinations are positively associated with post-IPO performance.
The Match of Tacit Knowledge on Institutions
The tacit knowledge of foreign social institutions is a strategic resource after going public.
The implementation of the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs depends on the support that they receive. Lungeau and Zajac (2015) The tacit knowledge transfer requires trust and a shared system (Dhanaraj et al., 2004) ; therefore, the match in the knowledge between VCs and CEOs facilitates a tacit knowledge transfer from returnee CEOs to organizations. The match presumes that both CEOs and VCs are from countries with advanced institutions. They fit together because of their shared tacit knowledge and tend to have a shared vision and approach to overcoming the challenges during the transition period.
The shared knowledge and value also avoids potential conflicts in ideologies and enhances the leadership of returnee CEOs (Tsui et al., 2006) . Having the shared knowledge and value with VCs, returnee CEOs can better implement their tacit knowledge while making strategic decisions. We hereby propose Hypothesis 5, as follows: 
Dependent Variables
We measure post-IPO accounting performance using ROA and ROS. ROA is estimated as the ratio of net earnings over total assets in the financial year following the IPO. ROS is the ratio of net earnings over sales in the following financial year. We use Tobin's Q to measure post-IPO market performance. Estimated as the ratio of the aggregate of market valuation over total assets in the financial year following the IPO, Tobin's Q indicates the market's assessment of future growth opportunities.
Returnee CEOs, VCs and Institutions
Returnee CEO is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the CEO had overseas working experience, overseas studying experience, overseas permanent residence, or joined a foreign nationality (excluding the Greater China Region), and 0 otherwise. We then identify the overseas destination of returnee CEOs and match the country with the legal enforcement scores in La porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005) . La porta et al. (1998) classifies legal enforcement into four dimensions including the rule of law, the level of corruption, the efficiency of the judicial system, and risk of expropriation, and constructs an index for 49 countries (not including China). Allen et al. (2005) constructs the index for China. (1998). We use the various dimensions of legal enforcement to measure CEOs' tacit knowledge of foreign legal institutions.
Rule of law refers to the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Corruption refers to ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Low scores indicate that government officials are more likely to demand special payments and that illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans. Efficiency of judicial system refers to the assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms produced by the country risk rating agency named Business
International Corp. Risk of expropriation refers to ICR's assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization.
Allen et al. (2005) does not construct the value of efficiency of judicial system and risk of expropriation for China due to the availability of data. We therefore rely on the ranks rather than the index value. Table 1A shows that the overseas destinations for returnee CEOs only include developed countries, namely the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Germany, Japan and France. Follow the discussion of Allen et al. (2005) , we assume that China ranks lower than the France, the foreign country with lowest efficiency of judicial system in the sample.
Comparing with other countries in the sample, the expropriation risk of China is higher than these developed countries in our sample according to the report of Credendo Group in 2015 14 . We therefore rank China as the lowest country for these two measures in our sample.
Likewise, we use the country-level power distance index and individualism index from
Hofstede (2001) To control for corporate governance, we incorporate board size and board independence.
Previous studies show that the board size is positively associated with firm performance (Certo et al., 2001) . We measure board size as the number of board directors prior to the IPO. Board independence is measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board prior to the IPO.
We also control for the founder CEO and CEO ownership. The founder CEO is controlled for, as the CEO founder status has an impact on IPO valuation and is perceived as uncertain (Certo et al., 2001) . Founder CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder, and zero otherwise. We also controlled for CEO ownership, calculated as the percentage of equity held by the CEO in the post-IPO firms. Descriptive statistics variables used in our regression models are reported in Table 1B .
"Insert Table 1B Here"
RESULTS
Baseline Regression
To test H1 on the effect of a returnee CEOs' tacit knowledge on post-IPO performance, we regress Returnee CEO on the post-IPO performance (ROA, ROS and Tobin's Q) of the subsequent year by using OLS regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 2 Here"
Endogeneity Issue
The setting might be subject to sample selection bias, since returnee CEOs are not randomly appointed. One possible alternative explanation for our finding is that entrepreneurial firms with good performance tend to appoint returnee CEOs before going public because they can 
Instrumental variable regression
To address the potential unobservable sample selection bias, we rely on an instrumental variable that predicts the likelihood of a firm having a returnee CEO; however this has nothing to do with the post-IPO performance, except through the channel of a returnee CEO. We use the number of international schools in the headquarter city of firms in the prior year of IPOs as the instrumental variable. In China, international schools use foreign education curriculums, follow foreign education systems, and create a similar foreign education environment for students.
Students in international schools prepare for A-level or SAT exams and target foreign universities.
The traditional education system in China is known for its exam-oriented and cramming method of teaching and fierce competition to get into internationally recognized Chinese universities.
Returnees therefore tend to send their kids to international schools 15 These results are reported in Table 2 Panel B. In the first-stage, the coefficient of the international school is significantly positive (0.0076, t-value=2.47). In the second-stage, we regress the predicted returnee CEOs on various performance measures. In columns 5 and 6, the coefficients of instrumental returnee CEOs remain significantly positive for ROA and ROS, suggesting that the results are robust to the control of the endogeneity issue.
Propensity-Score Match Method
We further address the potential observable sample selection bias with a one-to-one nearest neighbor PSM approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . We first sort the sample randomly and subsequently use the probit regression model with the same set of explanatory variables as in Panel A of Table 3 shows that the difference of observable explanatory variables between the treatment group (firms with returnee CEOs) and the control group (firms with local CEOs) is not significant after the matching procedure. In Panel B, we conduct the difference in mean test for the post-IPO performance. We find that ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q for returnee CEO managed firms are all significantly higher than the figure for non-returnee CEOs managed firms, rendering further support to H1.
"Insert Table 3 Here"
Tacit Knowledge of Returnee CEOs
To test H2, we regress the legal institutions of a CEO's destination against performance measures, based on the PSM matched sample. Table 4 Panel A shows that the coefficients of four measures of the legal institutions of CEO destinations, namely low corruption, the rule of law, the efficiency of the judicial system, and the risk of expropriation are significantly positive for the regressions of subsequent ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q. The results are also economically significant.
For example, one unit standard deviation increase of low corruption will lead to an increase of 0.0067, 0.0347, and 0.1428 in ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q, respectively. For a typical firm with median performance, this accounts for 11.06%, 23.63%, and 9.56% for ROA, ROS, and Tobin' Q, respectively. The results support H2, suggesting that the tacit knowledge of more advanced institutions leads to higher post-IPO performance. In the test, we also incorporate the market capitalization of CEOs' destinations to control for their connections in foreign capital markets and find their coefficients not significantly influence firm performance.
To test H3, we regress performance measures on two indicators of national culture, namely
Individualism and Short Power Distance. The results are reported in Panel B. Their coefficients are both significantly positive for the regressions of ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q. In terms of the size of the effect, for example, one unit standard deviation increase of individualism will lead to 0.0066, 0.0328, and 0.1409 increase in ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q, respectively. For the typical firm, this accounts for 10.90%, 22.33%, and 9.43% for ROA, ROS, and Tobin' Q, respectively.
The findings support H3 in that the tacit knowledge of individualism and a short power distance helps to firm to overcome the challenges during transition. Overall, the results in Table 4 further show that the positive impact of returnee CEOs on post-IPO performance is due to their knowledge of foreign institutions.
"Insert Table 4 Here"
The Match of Tacit Knowledge H4 asserts that the positive impact of returnee CEOs are strengthened by VCs from countries with more advanced institutions. Since VCs do not randomly choose entrepreneurial firms to invest in, we also need to rely on a PSM approach to construct a matched-sample to mitigate the selection bias issue. We first randomly rank all the observations and obtain the propensity score from the probit regression model with the same set of explanatory variables as Model 1 of Table 2 (excluding VC ownership). By using a nearest neighbor matching method, we match each non-VC-backed firm with a VC-backed firm to the nearest neighbor matching method.
Finally, we obtain a matched sample of 218 firms. We then compare the means of all matching covariates between VC-backed firms and non-VC backed firms and find no significant differences.
To test H4, we use regression performance measures on Returnee CEOs, legal institutions of VC origins, and their interaction term, based on the PSM sample. The results are reported in Table 5 . Although the coefficients of returnee CEO and legal institutions of VC origins are not significant, the coefficients of their interaction terms are significantly positive. In terms of the size of the effect, for example, one unit standard deviation increase of the interaction term of Returnee CEO*VCC will lead to an 0.0184, 0.0387, and 0.8908 increase in ROA, ROS, and Tobin's Q, respectively. For the typical firm, this accounts for 30.38%, 26.35%, and 59.64% for ROA, ROS, and Tobin' Q, respectively. The results support H4 and suggest that the VCs from more advanced institutions facilitate the transfer of returnee CEOs' tacit knowledge "Insert Table 5 Here"
In untabulated results, we also test whether VCs from countries with national cultures of low power distance and individualism strengthen the positive impact of returnee CEOs on post-IPO performance. We document positive coefficients on the interaction terms of returnee CEOs and the culture indices, providing evidence that VCs' national culture also influences the knowledge transfer of returnee CEOs.
To test H5 on the match of returnee CEOs and VCs in terms of shared tacit knowledge on advanced institutions, we regress firm performance on the legal institutions of CEO destinations, legal institutions of VC origins, and their interaction terms. Table 6 The results support H6 and confirm the importance of the match of tacit knowledge between CEOs and VCs.
In untabulated results, we also test whether the positive impact of returnee CEOs is more pronounced when both returnee CEOs and foreign VCs are from countries with national cultures of low power distance and individualism. The positive coefficients on the interaction term of CEOs' cultural indices and VCs cultural indices confirm our prediction.
"Insert Table 6 Here" Clearly, returnee entrepreneurs bring a brain gain to the home country. Our evidence contributes to this literature on the cross-border transfer of knowledge. The institutional transfer is not through resources but instead through tacit knowledge of institutional and legal structures that facilitate improved corporate governance and, in turn, better IPO performance. We do not find evidence associated with a resource transfer explanation of the results; for example, there is scant evidence that returning from a foreign market with larger market capitalization has any relationship to performance. The strategic benefit of knowledge transferred appears to have a much stronger and tangible benefit to executives of newly listed companies and their investors.
DISCUSSION
Our findings have implications for policy makers and practitioners. China is known for its weak institution (Allen et al., 2005) , which could affect the development of the economy and the financial market (North, 1990; La porta et al., 1998) . We provide original evidence that the advanced corporate institutions enhance the firm value in countries with weak institutions. This suggests that policy makers should continue to encourage attracting overseas Chinese talents and support them to run business and implement their knowledge on foreign institutions. Our findings also suggest policy makers should pay attention when matching CEOs and VCs and, in particular, encourage foreign venture capital investment in entrepreneurial firms led by returnees, because they strengthen the improvement of the corporate institution. In general, this paper points out that improving the institutions could contribute to the development of the entrepreneurial firms in transition.
CONCLUSION
Many studies in IB show that cross-border institution differences significantly affect the investment activities of the cross-border investor, such as VC and MNCs (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Guler and Guillen, 2010; Nahata et al., 2014 Dai and Nahata, 2016) . The transfer of institutions between countries is under-researched. In the context of the brain gain of China, we show that returnee CEOs act as agents carrying back to China the institution and the tacit knowledge of foreign advanced institutions, which help entrepreneurial firms in transition address the new challenges of legitimacy and compliance. In addition, the positive impact of returnee CEOs is more pronounced when foreign VC tacit knowledge about the social institutions matches the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs. Our insights benefit from analyzing the role of returnees under the tacit knowledge framework. This table reports the OLS regression analyses between the Returnee CEO and post one-year IPO operating performance. All the variables are defined in the Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the mean in difference between Returnee CEO and non-returnee CEO by determinants and post-IPO one-year operating performance in a Propensity-Match sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
This table reports the effect of the rule of law and national culture on post one-year IPO operating performance by classifying the origin of returnee CEOs in a propensity-match sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the effect of the Returnee CEO origin and VC origin match on post one-year IPO operating performance in a propensity-score match sample by VC backed. All the variables are defined in the Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. than other developed countries in the sample. The variable is equal to 0 for non-VC backed companies.
VC origin market capitalization
The natural logarithm of market capitalization of overseas destinations for overseas venture capital and the value of China for domestic venture capital. The variable is equal to 0 for non-VC backed companies. Data source: World Bank.
CEO ownership
The percentage of beneficial ownership in the post-IPO firm held by the CEO.
Total assets
The natural logarithm of total assets in the latest fiscal before the IPO.
Board size The number of directors in the board at the time of the IPO.
Board independence
The percentage of independent directors in the board at the time of the IPO.
VC ownership
The percentage of beneficial ownership in the post-IPO firm held by Venture Capitals.
High tech
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is classified as a high tech firm according to Certo et al. (2001) , and 0 otherwise.
Firm age
The age of the firm at the time of the IPO.
Risk factor
The total number of risk factors listed on the IPO prospectus.
Founder CEO Dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO is the founder at the time of the IPO, and 0 otherwise.
ROA
Return on assets post one-year of the IPO.
ROS
Return on sales post one-year of the IPO.
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q post one-year of the IPO.
International school
The number of international schools in the city of the firm's headquarters in the prior year of the IPO.
